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COMMENT
WHAT ABOUT MY RIGHT TO PRIVACY?
WHERE THE COURT WENT WRONG IN
FERGUSON V. CITY OF CHARLESTON*

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court has consistently found a
constitutional right to privacy despite its lack of an explicit
textual basis.' Characterized by Justice Brandeis in his
celebrated defense simply as "the right to be let alone,"2 the
right to privacy is one of the most distinguishing and
influential factors of life in the United States today. This right
has taken on many different forms throughout history in the
judicial system. In Whalen v. Roe,' the Court discussed three
facets of the right to privacy that have developed throughout
case law: (1) the right of the individual to be free in his private
affairs from government surveillance and intrusion; (2) the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters;
and (3) the interest in independence in making certain types of

*©2001 Erin F. Barton. All Rights Reserved.
'See generally Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-14 (1976) (holding that a
flyer which referred to the plaintiff as an "active shoplifter" did not deprive him of his
right to privacy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that the right to
privacy is broad enough to include a woman's right to choose whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965)
(finding a right to privacy in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights); Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (holding that only rights which are "fundamental" or "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty" can be included in the right to privacy).
2 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
3 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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decisions. Although the Supreme Court states that there is a
substantial privacy interest in Ferguson v. City of Charleston,'
which serves to distinguish it from most of the cases in this
area,6 the Court does little more to address any of the three
facets of the constitutional right to privacy, which are clearly
present in this case.7
The constitutional right of the individual to be free in
his private affairs from government surveillance and intrusion
is protected by the Fourth Amendment' through its application
to state law via the Fourteenth Amendment.9 In Ferguson, the
Supreme Court held that searching the urine of unknowing
patients for evidence of cocaine use violated the search and
seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment." This Comment
shows that although the Supreme Court's decision appears to
protect privacy rights, the Court added an additional step that
unnecessarily complicates the established special needs"
analysis. In addition, the Court neglected to decide the
important issue of what constitutes consent to a search or
seizure, leaving open the question whether a similar drugtesting policy would be constitutional in the future. Moreover,
the Medical University of South Carolina ("MUSC") policy
could still be held constitutional if the Fourth Circuit finds on
remand that the patients gave valid consent-effectively
nullifying the importance of the Supreme Court's decision.
This Comment also argues that both the Supreme Court
and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals were wrong in
refusing to determine whether there actually was a privacy
interest in medical records. The Supreme Court did not
address the issue of medical records at all, while the Fourth
Id. at 599 n.24 (citations omitted).
5 121 S. Ct. 1281, 1288 (2001) [hereinafterFerguson 1].
6 In other search and seizure cases involving urine testing, the court used the
special needs balancing test and found that there was not a substantial privacy
interest to outweigh the government need for performing the test.
7 Much has been written about the civil rights issues present in Ferguson.
Therefore, as much as possible, this Comment will not discuss that aspect of this case.
This Comment's focus will only be on the different elements of the right to privacy that
exist in this case.
8
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See generally Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)
(incorporating the Fourth Amendment).
,Ferguson 1, 121 S.Ct. at 1292-93.
"See infra Part II.C.
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Circuit dismissed the issue by arguing that even if there was
such a privacy interest, the government interest in this case
outweighed the patient's interest in non-disclosure. 2 This
Comment explores whether the women subjected to MUSC's
policy had a legitimate privacy interest in their medical
records.
In addition, the Supreme Court overlooked the
important issue of mandated substance abuse treatment under
penalty of arrest. The Supreme Court has ruled that there is a
right to privacy involved with certain types of decision making,
such as the right to decide the timing and method of one's
medical treatment.1 3 This Comment explores how the right to
refuse medical treatment was violated by the MUSC policy,
which was coercive in nature and lacked informed consent.
In sum, this Comment finds that: the Court complicated
the special needs analysis with their decision and left the
search and seizure issue open by ignoring the question of
consent; the MUSC policy violated the right to privacy in one's
medical records; and the MUSC policy violated the right to
make independent decisions regarding one's medical
treatment.
I.

BACKGROUND

In late 1989, MUSC implemented a policy ("Policy M-7")
that required hospital personnel to test the urine of pregnant
women, who met certain pre-determined indicia, for the
presence of cocaine. 4 The idea for MUSC's policy developed
when an obstetrics nurse, Nurse Brown, approached the
hospital's General Counsel about her concerns over what she
perceived to be an increasing rate of pregnant mothers using
12

Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469, 477-79 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd

121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001) [hereinafter FergusonIll.
13 Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't of Health, 47 U.S. 261 (1990).
14 In order to be tested, patients had to meet at least one of nine criteria

established by MUSC:
1) Separation of the placenta; 2) Intrauterine death; 3) No prenatal
care; 4) Prenatal care beginning after 24 weeks of pregnancy; 5) Fewer
than five prenatal visits; 6) Preterm labor without an obvious cause; 7)
A history of cocaine use; 8) Unexplained birth defects; or 9)
Intrauterine growth retardation without an obvious cause.
Ferguson I, 121 S. Ct. at 1285 n.4.
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cocaine. 5 MUSC then contacted the Solicitor General and,
subsequently, a task force was formed.16 The Solicitor General
informed the task force of a South Carolina law which could be
interpreted to mean that a woman who used cocaine after her
twenty-fourth week of pregnancy was guilty of distributing a
controlled substance to a minor.17 Based on this law, the MUSC
policy was developed to authorize testing the urine of all
pregnant mothers who met one of nine indicia developed by the
task force to indicate cocaine use.18 If the drug test results
indicated the presence of cocaine, the patient was reported to
the police department and was then arrested and charged with
distribution of cocaine to a minor. 9
In 1990, this policy was amended so that patients who
tested positive for cocaine use had the option of being arrested
or successfully completing MUSC's chosen inpatient substance
abuse treatment program.2" Patients who chose the treatment
program were not arrested unless they tested positive for
cocaine upon a second testing.1 Four women were subjected to
this version of the policy. Policy M-7 was terminated around
the time litigation began.22
Following the 1990 amendment, positive drug screen
results were recorded in medical charts and on Rolodex cards
kept in Nurse Brown's office.2 ' This information was then

provided to law enforcement officials. A patient could avoid
having positive test results forwarded to the police by
successfully completing a pre-chosen drug rehabilitation
" Id. at 1284.
16In addition to those already mentioned, the task force included the chief of
police and MUSC physicians. Id. at 1282, 1284.
" Any person eighteen years of age or over who . . . [distributes] a
controlled substance classified in Schedule I (b) and (c) which is a
narcotic drug or lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) and in Schedule II
which is a narcotic drug, or who . . . [distributes] crack cocaine to a
person under eighteen years of age is guilty of a felony and, upon
conviction, must be imprisoned for not more than twenty years or
fined not more than thirty thotisand dollars, or both ....
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-440 (Law. Co-op. 1997).
18Ferguson1, 121 S. Ct. at 1285.
19Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Petitioner's Reply Brief at 17-18, FergusonI (No. 99-936), 2000 WL
1236043.
"Id. at 14-15.
24Id.
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program." Patients who were arrested could similarly avoid
prosecution by attending a drug rehabilitation program." If the
patient successfully completed the treatment program, all
charges would be dropped. However, if a patient returned to
the hospital and again tested positive, she would be arrested
for distribution of a controlled substance to a minor.2 Only one
patient avoided arrest and prosecution by successfully
completing the drug program, and none of the women arrested
were ever prosecuted under the statute.2 9
Ten patients subjected to this policy brought an action
against the City of Charleston, MUSC, and various members of
the hospital staff and police force alleging a Fourth
Amendment violation, a civil rights violation based on the
policy's racially disparate impact, a violation of their
constitutional right to privacy, and a state law tort claim of
abuse of process."
A.

The District CourtDecision

The South Carolina District Court granted judgment as
a matter of law to the defendants on their claims of abuse of
process and violation of the right to privacy. 1 The Court ruled
that the urine screens fell within the scope of the Fourth
Amendment and submitted the question of whether the
patients consented to the searches to the jury. 2 The jury found
that the patients had consented to the searches and thus there
was no Fourth Amendment violation." The plaintiffs asked the
court for injunctive relief on their claim of violation of right to
privacy, but were denied. 4 The South Carolina District Court
also held for the defendants on the claim of disparate impact
25

Ferguson II, 186 F.3d at 474. This program was an inpatient drug

rehabilitation program located at
outpatient program that in many
who were single parents, working,
2Z Id.
2Id.
at 474-75.
'Id. at 474.
2Id.
at 475.
3"Ferguson II, 186 F.3d at
31 Id.
32 Id. at 475.
3Id.
4Id.

at 476.
at 475.

MUSC. The women were given no options for an
cases would have been a better fit for those women
or had child-care responsibilities.

475.
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discrimination."* The plaintiffs appealed, challenging the
sufficiency of evidence supporting the jury verdict, the court's
decision on the civil rights claim, and the judgment as a matter
of law 36regarding the abuse of process and right to privacy
claims.
B.

The Fourth CircuitDecision

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that testing without
a warrant the urine of the pregnant women who met the predetermined indicia of cocaine use did not violate the Fourth
Amendment."
Ignoring the issue of consent, the court
determined that MUSC's policy fell within the special needs
exception to Fourth Amendment requirements because the
search went beyond the needs of normal law enforcement.3 8
Using the "special needs" balancing test,39 the court upheld the
policy finding that the government interest in reducing cocaine
use by pregnant women outweighed the relatively minor
intrusion imposed by the urine testing.' The Fourth Circuit
also held that the there was no violation of the patients' right
to privacy.41 The court declined to address the issue of whether
there was a right to privacy in the women's medical records.
Instead, the court reasoned that even if such a right did exist,
the compelling government interest in this case outweighed
any such privacy right.4 2 The court specifically referred to the
"nonpublic nature of the disclosure" in their reasoning.' In

35 FergusonII, 186 F. 3d at
476.
36 Id.

'* Id.
38

at 479.
Id. at 476-77.
39 The special needs balancing test weighs the nature of the privacy interest
intruded upon by the search (legitimacy) and the character of the intrusion
(intrusiveness) against the nature and immediacy of the government issue and the
efficacy of its means for meeting it. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654-61. See also supra Part
II.B.
40
FergusonII, 186 F.3d at 477-79.
41
Id. at 483.
42 Id. at 482-83.
' Id. at 482.
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addition, the Fourth Circuit held that patients failed to
establish their civil rights claim of disparate impact
discrimination" and the tort claim of abuse of process."
C.

The Supreme Court Decision

Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court on
February 28, 2000, on the search and seizure issue." The Court
assumed, for the purposes of its decision, that the searches
were conducted without the consent of the patients.47 The Court
first distinguished Ferguson from its previous Fourth
Amendment special needs cases." The Court also focused at
length on the extent of law enforcement involvement in the
development and daily implementation of Policy M-7. In doing
so, the Court created an extra step in the special needs
analysis: determining a policy's immediate versus its ultimate
goal. The Court reasoned that although the policy's ultimate
goal may have been to prevent maternal drug use and protect
infants, the policy's obvious immediate goal was to collect
evidence to use against the woman in criminal proceedings.
The court held in a six to three decision that the searches
violated the Fourth Amendment.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

II.

The right of an individual to be free from government
surveillance and intrusion is protected by the Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Fourth Amendment
states in part, "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause.

. ."

In order for a Fourth

Amendment search to be reasonable, law enforcement must
have probable cause and/or a warrant." It is well established
at 482.
Ferguson II, 186 F.3d at 483.
46 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 528 U.S. 1187 (2000).
47
FergusonI, 121 S.Ct. at 1287.
48
Id. at 1288.
49
4"5 Id.

50

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

Id.
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by the Supreme Court that collection and testing of urine by
the state constitutes a search protected by the Fourth
Amendment.5 ' In Ferguson, the urine tests were performed
without the patients' consent and without a warrant. 2
Although the Supreme Court held that the searches violated
the Fourth Amendment, its analysis ignored some important
issues and complicated others. The Supreme Court assumed
that no consent was given for the searches, dismissing the
critical issue of whether these women gave valid consent. In
addition, the court held that this was not a special needs
search because the program's immediate objective was to
"generate evidence for law enforcement purposes."53 In contrast
to prior Fourth Amendment cases, they did not use the special
needs balancing test to make their decision.
A.

The Warrant Clause

The Fourth Amendment states that in order for a
search to be reasonable, law enforcement must first have a
warrant or its equivalent, probable cause.54 Courts have made
exceptions to the warrant requirement when, under the
circumstances, the process of obtaining a warrant would
frustrate the purpose behind the search.55 However, the Court
in Vernonia School District v. Acton stated that "[tihe
individualized suspicion requirement has a legal pedigree as
old as the Fourth Amendment itself, and it may not be easily
cast aside in the name of policy concerns."56 When law
enforcement officials are able to present with particularity
5, See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997) (testing urine of candidates
for public office is a Fourth Amendment search); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646, 652 (1995) (testing urine of student athletes is a Fourth Amendment search);
Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989) (testing urine
of U.S. customs officers is a Fourth Amendment search); Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989) (testing urine of railroad employees is a
Fourth Amendment search).
52 Supreme Court Brief of Petitioner at 13, Ferguson I (No. 99-936)
[hereinafter
Petitioner's Briefi.
Ferguson1, 121 S. Ct. at 1291.
"'U.S.CONST. amend. IV.
55 See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 679; New Jersey
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340
(1985); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-533 (1967).
5G515 U.S. at 678 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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their reasons for the search, the person(s) to be searched, and
the items to be searched for, then a warrant is preferred. 7
MUSC claims that their nine indicia of cocaine use provided
the necessary individual suspicion.58 However, these indicia
were vague and overbroad. Many of the factors were more
indicative of poverty and a lack of quality medical care than of
cocaine use.59 MUSC needed more than a hunch that these
women had ingested cocaine and an alleged concern for the
fetuses to justify their search. The Court will not sustain
searches for which there is no demonstrated probable cause
solely because the officers reasonably expect to find evidence of
a crime." The Supreme Court has held that "searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval
by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions."61
In Ferguson, the MUSC staff and law enforcement were
searching the urine of pregnant mothers who met certain
criteria developed to indicate the presence of cocaine.62 This
search was narrowly defined and therefore a warrant could
have been obtained by law enforcement officials with little
effort at any one of many stages between when the patient
entered the clinic and the subsequent arrest. When a pregnant
mother entered the medical center exhibiting specific
symptoms of cocaine use, law enforcement could have been
U

In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354 (1967), the Court held that

wiretapping a telephone booth, without a warrant, violated the Fourth Amendment
because the surveillance was so narrowly defined that a magistrate could have
constitutionally authorized the limited search that took place.
5"Supreme Court Brief of Respondents at 8, Ferguson (No. 99-936) [hereinafter
Respondent's Brief].
"9 Cf American Medical Association Board of Trustees, Legal Interventions
DuringPregnancy,264 JAMA 2663, 2668 (1990) (citations omitted).
The women most likely to be prosecuted for exposing their fetuses to
harmful substances are those from lower economic levels. These
women are more likely to lack access to both prenatal care and
substance abuse treatment because of financial barriers. They are
often uninsured or under insured. Even when Medicaid is available,
women may still lack access to medical care because of inadequate
system capacity.
Id.
61 Katz, 389 U.S. at 356.
Id. at 357.
62 Ferguson1, 186 F.3d
at 474.
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contacted so that a warrant could be obtained before the urine
was even collected.63 Or, once a pregnant mother was suspected
of drug use, the urine could have been collected first and then
law enforcement contacted so that they could obtain a warrant
before the urine was screened for cocaine.64 Likewise, once the
urine was screened for cocaine and the patient reported, law
enforcement could have obtained a warrant before the patient's
medical records and test results were seized. As the Court held
in Katz,65 this search was so narrowly defined that at many
points during the process it could have, and therefore should
have, been presented to a magistrate for constitutional
authorization.
B.

Consent

Valid consent can make a warrantless search
reasonable. As mentioned earlier, the South Carolina District
Court found that the patients had consented to the search of
their urine and that, therefore, there was no Fourth
Amendment violation.6 The Fourth Circuit failed to address
the issue of consent by affirming under the Fourth Amendment
exception for a "special needs" search. The Supreme Court
assumed that valid consent was not provided even before
beginning their Fourth Amendment analysis. This was a
critical "oversight" by the Supreme Court that not only ignored
the coercive elements and deception present in a program such
as Policy M-7, but also left open the possibility that the
program will be held constitutional by the Fourth Circuit on
remand."

Cocaine can be detected in urine up to seventy-two hours after ingestion.
Supreme Court Amicus Brief of the American Medical Association at 13, Ferguson I
(No. 99-936).
64The Court in Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,
617-18,
suggested that the actual urine collection and the subsequent analysis were two
separate searches.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 356.
186 F.3d at 476.

GG

GGFerguson II,

The Supreme Court remanded Ferguson to the Fourth Circuit for
determination of the consent issue. Ferguson 1, 121 S.Ct. at 1295-96.
G7
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The patients subjected to Policy M-7 did not give valid
consent for their urine to be tested for the presence of cocaine.
In order to be valid, consent must be voluntarily given and
cannot be the result of coercion or duress.6 8 Voluntariness is a
question of fact to be determined after evaluating the totality
of the circumstances.6 9 In Ferguson, the weight of the
evidence-including the scope of the consent given, the scope of
the actual search, the consent forms used, the deceptive tactics,
and the issue of emotional distress-indicates that consent was
not freely and voluntarily given.
1. Scope of Consent
A person consenting to a search may place limits upon
her consent, either expressly or implicitly, referring to time,
duration, or purpose of the search.7" The Court, in Florida v.
Jimeno,71 limited the scope of a search to that which the person
expressly authorized, as would be understood by a reasonable
person. MUSC claims that all patients signed a consent form
upon admission to the hospital authorizing hospital staff to
conduct any necessary tests on the patients' urine, including
drug tests.72 Although patients did sign a basic hospital consent
form, the patients authorized searches of their urine for
medical and prenatal treatment purposes; they did not
authorize disclosure to law enforcement.73 The patients had no
knowledge that their results could be turned over to law
enforcement and could potentially result in arrest. In 1999, the
Georgia Supreme Court held that a defendant's consent was
invalid when officials told him they were testing his urine in
order to determine whether he was under the influence of
drugs or alcohol, but, when in reality, the results were used as

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973).
6' Id. at 226.
701 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.1 (3d ed. 1996).
71 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991).
72Respondents Brief at 38, Ferguson (No. 99-936).
m See U.S. v. Lipshitz, 132 F. Supp. 519 (E.D.N.Y 1955) (holding that where
law enforcement approaches a revenue agent conducting a regular audit with consent
of defendant and instructs him to conduct a more extensive audit in order to obtain
evidence of criminal wrongdoing, any evidence obtained is in violation of Fourth
Amendment because defendant only gave consent for a limited routine audit.)
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evidence in a drug possession charge. 74 This case is similar to
the facts in Ferguson where the patients' urine was tested
under the guise of medical necessity for prenatal treatment or
delivery, but the results were used as evidence of the mothers'
criminal wrongdoing. Even if the patients gave consent to have
their urine tested, it was solely for medical reasons related to
their pregnancy: any other test was outside the scope of their
consent.
2. Deception
Although it is true that under Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte75 a person does not need to be notified about the
option to withhold consent,76 this does not give law enforcement
authorization to use any deception necessary.7 7 The actual
effect of the deception on the voluntariness of a person's
consent is decided on a case by case basis.7' However, courts
have consistently held consent as involuntary when the
deceptive tactics fail to inform the person of any suspicion of
their criminal wrongdoing.7 9 In Ferguson, patients did not
receive any notice of the involvement of law enforcement until

74 Turpin v. Helmeci 518 S.E.2d 887 (Ga. 1999). See also State v. Frazier,
494
S.E.2d 36 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that consent to have one's urine tested for the
presence of alcohol or drugs relating to a misdemeanor offense of operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence is not voluntary consent to have urine tested for
presence of cocaine related to a felony charge of drug possession); State v. Gerace, 437
S.E.2d 862 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that consent given to have blood tested for
presence of drugs and alcohol is not voluntary consent to have blood tested for DNA to
be used as evidence in prosecution for rape); Beasley v. State, 419 S.E.2d 92 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1992) (holding that consent given to have urine tested for alcohol or drugs in
order to determine bond was not voluntary consent to have urine test used as evidence
in felony possession charge).
76 412 U.S. 218 (1873).
Id. at 231.
LAFAVE, supra note 70, at § 8.2.
78

Id.

79See U.S. v. Phillips, 497 h2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1974) (illegal entry of DEA
and

local law enforcement under guise of investigating a fictitious robbery); Arizona v.
Petersen, 604 P.2d 267 (Ct. App. 1979) (police asked to search defendanes new car to
look for object left by previous owner, court deemed consent involuntary); People v.
Jefferson, 43 A.D.2d 112, 350 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1 Dep't. 1973) (police violated the Fourth
Amendment when they obtained entry into an apartment under the ruse of
investigating a gas leak).
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after the urine tests were performed." In fact, it is questionable
whether the potential for arrest was ever disclosed. After a
patient's urine test came back positive, the patient received
two documents, the Solicitor General's letter explaining
MUSC's policy and a letter entitled 4To Our Patients." 1
Neither of these documents expressly stated that the test
results would be turned over to law enforcement officials as
evidence for arrest. 2 Moreover, the women never realized that
they were being tested by law enforcement officials-the
hospital staff never made their relationship to law enforcement
known to the patients.
3. Coercion
Respondents argued that the women subjected to the
policy freely gave their urine for testing by choosing to have
their treatment at MUSC.' This argument has obvious flaws.
The women attended this high risk clinic for financial reasons.
Their financial status, combined with the fact that most of
them were in labor when tested, poses important questions
about whether they were coerced to sign any consent form.
Arguably it was coercive to even approach women who were in
active labor, and expect them to understand to what they were
actually "consenting," especially since many of the women had
a limited educational background and no knowledge of legal
forms. In addition, the deceptive tactics used by MUSC in
obtaining consent were inherently coercive because patients
might have felt that if they did not sign the hospital's consent
forms that they would not be able to receive critically necessary
medical services from the public clinic.4

1 Petitioner's

1d.
I

8

Reply Brief at 15, Ferguson (No. 99-936).

Id.
SRespondents Brief at 38, Ferguson(No. 99-936).

Cf New York v. Jefferson, 43 A.D.2d 112, 350 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1' Dep't 1973)
(holding that police violated the Fourth Amendment when they obtained entry into an
apartment under the ruse of investigating a gas leak because they deprived the
defendant of free choice by implying that failure to allow entry would result in damage
to person and/or property).
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4. Individual Factors
Courts have also taken individual factors, such as
maturity, education, intelligence, and emotional distress, into
account when determining whether consent was voluntary.'
Courts usually evaluate the nature of the events preceeding
the consent and how those events might affect a person's
ability to make a voluntary decision. 6 The current majority
approach is that in order for emotional distress to be a
determinative factor in whether consent is voluntary, it must
be "so profound as to impair [a person's] capacity for selfdetermination or understanding" of what law enforcement was
seeking. 7 Some courts have found that emotional trauma
resulting from an accident is sufficient to determine that
consent was involuntary.88 Clearly, being in labor is an
extremely stressful and emotional condition. Many of the
women arrested under the policy at MUSC "consented" to the
urine tests upon admission while they were in labor.89
Moroever, as discussed in Part I.A. above, these women were
were financially unstable, often under-educated, and lacking
knowledge in legal issues, and had nowhere else to turn for
medical care. Looking at the totality of the circumstances,
these consents could not have been deemed voluntary.
C.

Special Needs Exception

Searches performed without a warrant or probable
cause may be found reasonable when special needs, beyond the
See LEFAVE, supra note 70, at § 8.2(e).

86Id.
88

United States v. Duran, 957 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir 1992).
Commonwealth v. Angivoni, 417 N.E.2d 422 (Mass. 1981) (explaining that

consent given while in the emergency room with a dislocated hip was not voluntary
because ability to reason may have been compromised by emotional trauma from
having just been in an accident). See also People v. Lind, 18 N.E.2d 189 (Ill. 1938)
(holding that consent given by defendant's wife was not valid because she was in a
highly nervous state after husband and son returned home wounded in middle of night
and were later arrested).
89Petitioner's Brief at 41, FergusonI (No. 99-936). This Comment is in no way
arguing that women who are pregnant, or in active labor, are not competent. However,
the stress of labor in combination with other factors, in some women may lead to a
impaired ability to give voluntary and knowledgeable consent.
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normal need for law enforcement, make the process of getting a
warrant or the requirement of individualized suspicion
impractical."0 In Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the steps
in a special needs analysis have been well established. The
courts must first answer the threshold question of whether the
search is a special need-whether it is "divorced from the
State's general interest in law enforcement."9 1 If the answer is
yes,92 the court must then conduct a balancing test in order to
determine whether the special needs search is reasonablebalancing the nature of the privacy interest and the character
of the intrusion against the nature and immediacy of the
government interest and efficacy of the means chosen. 3
Although they arrived at different conclusions, both
the District Court and the Fourth Circuit conducted the same
well established special needs analysis. However, the Supreme
Court did something different. With no explanation or
foundation in case law or statutory law, the Court changed the
special needs analysis by adding an unnecessary step, thus
complicating an already difficult test. The Court began its
discussion by stating that the "central and indispensable
feature of [Policy M-7] from its inception was the use of law
enforcement... ."" However, the Court did not stop here. 5 The
Court goes on to look at the purpose of the policy,
distinguishing between the policy's ultimate and immediate
purposes. This survey of a program's purposes had only been
done once before in a case decided earlier in the same term. 6
The court has found "special needs" in a variety of circumstances. See, e.g.,
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652-53 (random urine testing of student athletes); Mich. Dep't of
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (sobriety checkpoints for motorists); Nat'l
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989) (drug-testing U.S.
Customs officers); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 (mandatory drug-testing of railroad
employees).
" 1Ferguson I, 121 S. Ct. at 1290.
92 But see Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987). Griffin is the only special
needs case which allowed significant law enforcement involvement. Id. at 880.
However, this case is often rationalized because the searches were of probationers who
have a diminished expectation of privacy. Id. at 873-874 (citations omitted). Pregnant
mothers in no way compare to people on probation.
93Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654-61.
94FergusonI, 121 S. Ct. at 1290.
95See infra nn.95-107 and accompanying text.
9GSee generally City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (striking
down an automobile checkpoint program because although the ultimate purpose of the
program was to keep drugs out of the city, the program's immediate purpose was to
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The Court incorporated this new spurious step into
their analysis in Ferguson.While determining that Policy M-7's
ultimate purpose was to get pregnant women off drugs, the
Court determined that the policy's immediate purpose was to
"generate evidence for law enforcement purposes.""' They
rationalized this new step by reasoning that "law enforcement
involvement always serves some broader social purpose or
objective ...
virtually any nonconsenual suspicionless search
could be immunized under the special needs doctrine by
defining the search solely in terms of its ultimate, rather than
immediate, purpose.""8 Based on their interpretation of the
policy's immediate purpose, the Court held that the search was
not a special need and, therefore, was inconsistent with the
Fourth Amendment.
This additional step of inquiring into both the ultimate
and immediate purposes of a program is completely
unnecessary. Fourth Amendment case law, and specifically
special needs case law, provides a stable, well-tested
framework for analyzing special needs questions. The earlier
cases all begin with the threshold issue of the involvement of
law enforcement. One element that the Court evaluated in
these previous cases was whether information from the
searches was turned over to law enforcement. In Vernonia,"
the Court held that drug-testing the urine of student athletes
for drugs was constitutional, but emphasized the significance
that the test results were "not turned over to law enforcement
authorities or used for any internal disciplinary function.""'
This lack of any law enforcement involvement was also
a factor in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
where the Court held it constitutional to test the urine of U.S.
Customs officers.0 1 The Court, in Von Raab explicitly stated,
"It is clear that the ...drug-testing program is not designed to
serve the ordinary needs of law enforcement. Test results may
not be used in a criminal prosecution of the employee without

collect evidence for law enforcement purposes).
17 Ferguson I, 121 S. Ct. at 1291 (emphasis
omitted).
98Id. at 1291-92.
9"515 U.S. 646 (1995).
' Id. at 658.
101489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989).
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the employee's consent."0 2 Another element the Court
examined was whether there was a threat to public safety. In
Chandler v. Miller,' the Court expressly stated that if "public
safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment
precludes the suspicionless search, no matter how conveniently
arranged."'0 4 The Court also looked at the amount of
involvement by law enforcement in the development and
administration of the program.'0 5
The involvement of law enforcement in the MUSC
program is not disputed by the Court in Ferguson. The MUSC
policy was developed by and for law enforcement. Law
enforcement officials developed the MUSC policy on the basis
of the South Carolina statute for distribution of narcotics to a
minor.0 0 In fact, the coercive approach of threatening to
imprison someone was a commonly used tactic developed by
South Carolina law enforcement to divert people into substance
abuse treatment programs.0 7 The law enforcement officials
went so far as to formally implement the MUSC policy by
sending out various memoranda to hospital staff setting
guidelines, including which women would be tested and how
the testing would be conducted.'08 Hospital staff was even
trained by law enforcement to keep chain of custody with each
urine sample. In the end, the MUSC policy was to turn over all
positive test results to law enforcement, which ultimately
resulted in arrest, and then use the threat of prosecution to
force the women into substance abuse treatment.
Finally, there was no proven threat to public safety
comparable to those found in other special needs cases. °' 9 The
only danger in Ferguson was to the mother and the fetus, both
"2 Id. at 666.
103

520 U.S. 305 (1997).

" Id. at 323.
"5Id. at 321-22.
"' S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-440 (Law. Co-op. 1997).
107 Petitioner's Brief at 30, Ferguson (No. 99-936).

"' Id.at 4.
09See generally Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997) (prevention of drug
use by newly elected government officials); Vernonia v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995)
(popular student athletes using drugs in epidemic proportions); Mich. Dep't of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (prevention and deterrence of drunk drivers);
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (prevention and deterrence
of drugs use by train conductors); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656 (1989) (prevention of drug use by U.S. Customs officials who were responsible
for firearms and stopping drug trafficking across the borders).
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of whom were already harmed by the time MUSC searched the
mother's urine. The seriousness of exposing an unborn fetus to
cocaine cannot alone justify a warrantless search.11 The Court
relied on this and other evidence in deciding that the policy
was not divorced from the State's interest in law enforcement.
The Court should have stopped the analysis here. Once the
program cannot satisfy the threshold test, it is not a special
need and, therefore, violates the Fourth Amendment. There is
no need to continue the analysis.
The use of the Court's newly developed second step,
analyzing the search's purpose, adds nothing to their analysis.
The Court has already determined that the motive behind a
search is irrelevant; thus, MUSC's alleged medical or
treatment reasons cannot validate an otherwise unreasonable
search.'
This makes the Court's analysis into the hospital's
claim that its purpose was to help pregnant women stop taking
drugs extraneous. Moreover, as the Court briefly states, any
search can be justified by relying only on its ultimate purpose.
However, as Justice Kennedy argues in his dissent, "By very
definition, in almost every case the immediate purpose of a
search policy will be to obtain evidence."1 All of the Court's
previous special needs cases were decided based on the policy's
ultimate goal, and all could arguably be said to have had an
1 For example, the policy
immediate goal of collecting evidence."
upheld in Skinner had the goal of ensuring railroad safety, but
its immediate goal under the majority's analysis was to collect
evidence of drug use by railroad employees.114 The policy upheld
in Vernonia had the goal of deterring drug use by teens,
whereas its immediate goal was to collect evidence of drug use
by student atheletes. "5 Moreover, the policy upheld in Von
Raab had the goal of deterring drug use in sensitive
government positions, but the immediate goal was to collect
110Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). "We decline to hold that the

seriousness of the offense under investigation itself creates exigent circumstances of
the kind that under the Fourth Amendment justify a warrantless search." Id. at 394.
i In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811-13 (1996), the Court held that
illegal motives cannot invalidate an otherwise reasonable search.
112Ferguson I, 121 S. Ct. at 1294 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
113
114

(1989)).

Id. at 1293 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. (referring to Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602

I" Id. (referring to Vernonia v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995)).

FERGUSON v. CITY OF CHARLESTON

2001]

evidence of drug use by people applying for those positions.
What distinguishes Ferguson from the Court's previous special
needs cases is not its immediate purpose for searches, but the

integral involvement of law enforcement.
The Court did use its analysis to ultimately come to the
correct decision, that the MUSC policy was an unconstitutional
search. However, this case has altered the well-established
special needs test for future cases in this area. The additional
step of evaluating a program's purpose not only lacks
foundation based on previous case law, but is unnecessary and,
in most cases, will not change the final outcome of a case.

III.

THE INTEREST IN AVOIDING DISCLOSURE OF PERSONAL
MATTERS

The Supreme Court in Ferguson did not address the
right to privacy of personal matters, in particular the right to
medical privacy. However, in a bold step, the Court did briefly
discuss the substantial invasion of privacy involved in the
unauthorized dissemination of medical test results to third
persons." 6 It even went so far as to say that the reasonable
expectation of privacy for a typical patient undergoing testing
in a hospital is that those test results will not be shared with
117
consent.
her
without
personnel
non-hospital
any
Unfortunately, the Court did not go further and find an actual
right to privacy in the drug test results collected at MUSC.
The right to privacy has been limited by the Court to
those personal rights "which are 'fundamental' or 'implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty."""' Historically, those personal
rights have been limited to the areas of marriage, family,
procreation, education, and child-rearing.'19 The right to
privacy has been interpreted broadly enough to include the
decision to terminate one's pregnancy.10 In Whalen v. Roe, the
Supreme Court interpreted the constitutional right to privacy
broadly to include an "interest in avoiding disclosure of
,'6
Ferguson I, 121 S. Ct. at 1288 (referring to Nat'l Treasury Employees Union
U.S. 656 (1989)).
v. Von Raab,
117Id.489
118Paul,424

19Id.
120

U.S. at 713 (citations omitted).

See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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personal matters."12 1 This right has been interpreted by
subsequent case law to include a right to privacy in one's
medical records.122
However, this right is not absolute. In Whalen, the
Court held that the government's interests in record-keeping
and mandated reporting of vital information, such as venereal
disease and child abuse, outweighed the individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters.1 2 The factors that the
Court considered included the state's responsibility for the
health of the community,1 24 security provisions for the personal
121
12fo
information,
potential for harm through disclosure,126
and
whether1 27the disclosure occurred as a result of a statutory
scheme.
Other cases have looked specifically at the privacy
interest in avoiding disclosure of one's medical records. In
United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 25 the Third
Circuit declared that "[t]here can be no question that . . .
medical records, which may contain intimate facts of a
personal nature, are well within the ambit of materials entitled
to privacy protection.' ' 29 The Court in Westinghouse further
expanded the balancing test enunciated in Whalen to include
seven factors: (1) the type of record requested; (2) the
information it does or might contain; (3) the potential for harm
in any subsequent non-consensual disclosure; (4) the injury
from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was
generated; (5) the adequacy of safeguards to prevent
unauthorized disclosure; (6) the degree of need for access; and

121429

U.S. 589, 599 (1977).

122 See Doe v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d 1133 (3rd Cir. 1995);

U.S. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3rd Cir. 1980). But see Jarvis v.
Wellman, 52 F.3d 125 (6th Cir. 1995) (Court held that disclosure of plaintiffs medical
records did not rise to the level of a breach of a right recognized as "fundamental"
under the constitution).
123 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602.
124
id.

'2

Id. at 605-06.

121Id. at 604 n.32.
'

27

Id. at 603.

128638

F.2d 570 (1980).

129Id. at 577.
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(7) whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated
public policy, or other recognizable public interest militating
130
toward that access.
The Supreme Court dismissed the issue of consent in
Ferguson by assuming that the patients did not give' valid
consent to the searches.'' The Fourth Circuit also declined to
visit the issue of a privacy right in one's medical records by
stating that "even if Appellants possess a constitutional
interest in the nondisclosure of their medical records, that
interest is outweighed by the interest of the government in
disclosure.""' However, as illustrated below, when using the
established Westinghouse test, the patients' privacy interests in
Ferguson outweigh the government's interest.
The first two factors to consider are the type of record
3
Instead of
requested and the information it might contain."
simply releasing the drug test results, MUSC turned over the
full medical records of women with positive urine test results
to the prosecutor and other law enforcement without the
patients' knowledge.' In fact, law enforcement officials were
allowed to freely browse the medical records kept in Nurse
Brown's office while unattended by hospital staff."5 Those
records not only contained personal medical information
related to the patient's pregnancy and drug use, but also any
including sexually transmitted diseases and
other illnesses
136
HIV status.
The third and fourth Westinghouse factors to consider
are the potential for harm in any subsequent disclosure and
the injury of such a disclosure to the relationship in which the
record was generated."' The potential for harm to the pregnant
mothers and to the physician-patient relationship from the
disclosure of patient medical records was great. Once a
disclosure was made, the women were often arrested
immediately after childbirth, some while still bleeding and in

0

13 Id.

at 578.
"'Ferguson 1, 121 S. Ct. at 1287.
32Ferguson II, 186 F.3d at 483.
3

13

Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578.
Petitioner's Brief at 14-15, Ferguson I (No. 99-936).

3

"36Id. at 14-15.
at 15.

1 Id

'37 Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578.
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pain, and taken to jail.138 One patient was arrested during her
ninth month of pregnancy, spent
139 that last month in jail, and
was released only to give birth.
Other potential harms from this policy of disclosure are
more indirect. It is the opinion of the American Medical
Association ("AMA") that MUSC's policy will irreparably
damage the physician-patient relationship, resulting in
pregnant mothers avoiding medical treatment and prenatal
care. "' The AMA stated, "Drug-testing regimens like the
Charleston policy drive a wedge between physicians and
pregnant patients."' In fact, some patients who were arrested
did express hesitation in seeking out medical treatment in the
future.'42 In its amicus brief, the AMA stated that "[without
complete faith in the sanctity of discussions with their
physicians, patients will be reluctant to disclose potentially
incriminating behaviors, even if such disclosures are necessary
to receive diagnosis or treatment."'3 This avoidance of medical
treatment could be dangerous for both the mother and her
unborn fetus. The AMA expressed strong concerns about the
unreliability of urine screens and the need for voluntary
disclosure by the patient in44order to effectively treat both the
mother and newborn infant.
The fifth factor to consider is the adequacy of the
safeguards in place to prevent an unauthorized disclosure.'
There were no reported security provisions or guidelines in
MUSC's policy to ensure that personal medical information,
such as HIV status, was not being disseminated. In fact, it was
often the case that law enforcement would come to Nurse
Brown's office to peruse patients' medical records. 4 ' Moreover,
the information was also reported to social services agencies
8 Petitioner's Brief at 7-8, FergusonI (No. 99-936).
139Id.

"0 AMA's Amicus Brief at 10, FergusonI (No. 99-936).
11.
patients testified that their experience in being arrested based on

141 Id. at
142 "The

searches conducted by the hospital according to the Search Policy has caused them
permanently to distrust medical providers." Petitioner's Brief at 15, Ferguson I (No. 99936).
143 AMA's Amicus Brief at 11, Ferguson I (No. 99-936) (citation omitted).
144Id. at 13-18.
145 Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578.
141 Petitioner's Brief at 14-15, Ferguson I (No. 99-936).
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and was discussed with third parties in Suspected Child Abuse
& Neglect meetings. "7
The sixth factor to consider is the degree of need for
access.'48 The disclosure in Ferguson was in no way meant for
public health record-keeping, reporting, research, or statistical
purposes. The hospital was not trying to determine rates of
cocaine use in pregnant women in the community, risk factors,
treatment options, or injury to the infant. The policy's sole
purpose was to arrest pregnant women who used cocaine.
The final Westinghouse factor to consider is whether
there is an express statutory, public policy, or public interest
that justifies the access.'49 MUSC defended its policy on the
state statutory basis. 5 However, the statutes that the policy
are based on say nothing about an unborn fetus, viable or
not."' The specific statute on which the hospital policy is based
states that it is a felony to distribute controlled substances or
crack cocaine to "a person under eighteen years of age." 5 ' In
South Carolina case law, this statute has been interpreted to
include a viable fetus.'
The Court in Whalen established a constitutional right
to avoid disclosure of personal matters.5 4 The Third Circuit
interpreted this right to include privacy in one's medical
records. 5 The MUSC policy violated the patients' right to
privacy in their medical records by turning them over to law
enforcement officials. Applying the balancing test established
in Westinghouse,'5 6 the patients' privacy interests outweighed
the government's interest in disclosure.

Patients who tested positive for cocaine were tracked through Suspected

147

Child Abuse & Neglect ("SCAN") meetings. The hospital forwarded confidential
medical records to all meeting participants on each patient being tracked. Id. at 15.
Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578.
Id.
" S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-440.
118

149

0

' The MUSC policy was the first time that S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-440 was
applied to a pregnant woman with a viable fetus. Petitioner's Brief at 16, Ferguson
(No. 99-936).
I52
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-440.

'5
'

FergusonII, 186 F.3d at 474 n.2.

429 U.S. at 599.
Westinghouse, 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3rd Cir. 1980).
uId.at 578.
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INTEREST IN INDEPENDENCE IN DECISION MAKING

The courts have ruled that there is a right to privacy in
certain types'of decision making. 157 The most obvious example
of protected decision making is the act of giving consent. In
Ferguson, the act of giving consent becomes important in two
different contexts: the patients' ability to consent to search or
seizure"' and the patients' right to informed consent for
medical procedures and/or treatment. The courts have more
commonly addressed decision making in the context of medical
care. The courts have given people the right to independently
decide to refuse even life-sustaining medical treatment. 59 And,
especially relevant in this case is the right to make personal
behavior decisions without government interference. Both the
Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit neglected to address
any of the above privacy issues, therefore failing to reinforce
one's right to privacy in personal decision making.
A.

Informed Consent

Although not addressed by the Supreme Court, there is
consent issue in this case. Informed. consent is a
informed
an
fairly recent phenomenon in the medical profession, emerging
16 0
with the strong movement for increased patient autonomy.
The leading case in this area is Canterbury v. Spence, 6" which
established that doctors have a duty to inform their patients of
all information necessary for them to make an intelligent
decision. Although jurisdictions vary on the specifics,
Canterbury set the basic standards for an informed consent
claim. A patient must show that the physician or other
17 See generally Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)
(discussing the right to decide to refuse medical treatment); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693 (1976) (outlining the right to privacy in personal decision-making areas such as
family relationships, marriage, procreation, and child-rearing.); Canterbury v. Spence,
464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that a physician has a duty to disclose all
material risks necessary for a patient to make an informed consent to medical
treatment).
158See supra Part II.B.

"9 See generally Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
"IoMarsha Garrison & Carl E. Schneider, Law and Bioethics: Individual
Autonomy and Social Regulation (2000) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
161464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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healthcare professional failed to disclose a material risk and
that the patient would not have chosen to continue with the
treatment if the risk(s) had been disclosed. 6 2 Most importantly,
the undisclosed risk must have resulted in an injury."3
This is a relevant issue in Ferguson. The mothers who
received prenatal care from MUSC signed a general consent
form for medical treatment.'" However, this form did not
disclose that a patient's laboratory results may be turned over
to law enforcement as evidence against that patient which
could result in their arrest. 6 5 This is clearly a material risk of
receiving medical treatment at MUSC that, had it been
disclosed, might have resulted in a patient refusing treatment.
In addition, many women did experience an injury as a result
of this undisclosed information in that they were arrested and
some while still pregnant, and some immediately
taken to jail,
66
birth.
after
Right to Refuse Medical Treatment

B.

The Supreme Court recognized that there is a liberty
interest in the ability of a competent adult to refuse medical
treatment, even life-sustaining treatment as in Cruzan v.
Director Missouri Dep't of Health.'6' However, the right to

refuse medical treatment is not absolute; state intervention
may be justified when state interests outweigh patient
interests.'6 8 In Ferguson, this right becomes even more
complicated by the issues of substance abuse treatment and
pregnancy.

62

1

'6

Id. at 786-90.
Id. at 790.

Brief at 14, FergusonI (No. 99-936).
'"
165Petitioner's
Id.
' One petitioner, Lori Griffin, was told that she was being released to
go home, only to be arrested in her hospital room. At eight months pregnant Ms.
Griffin was handcuffed, shackled, and taken to jail where she remained until she gave
birth three weeks later. Another petitioner, Sandra Powell, was arrested immediately
after giving birth and was handcuffed and taken to jail while still bleeding and in her
hospital gown. Petitioner's Brief at 7-8, FergusonI (No. 99-936).
167497 U.S. 261 (1990).
'68Id. at 280-282.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

1.

[Vol. 67: 1

Substance Abuse Treatment

Although there is an established right for an adult of
sound mind to refuse medical treatment,16 9 there are currently
no cases that address the right to refuse substance abuse
treatment. Because substance abuse treatment often includes
more psychotherapy and mental health counseling than
medical treatment, mandatory drug treatment can be
analogized to civil commitment. In fact, substance abuse
treatment is included in the definition of mental health
treatment in the South Carolina statute governing the rights of
mental health patients.170 Mandated inpatient substance abuse
treatment involves a patients' liberty interests and, therefore,
should be evaluated as an involuntary civil commitment. The
Court set the basic standard for involuntary civil commitment
in O'Connor v. Donaldson,"' stating that "a State cannot
constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous
individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by
himself or with the help of willing and responsible family
members or friends."'72 South Carolina has included this
dangerousness requirement in its state statute governing
emergency alcohol and drug abuse commitment.'73 This
standard has evolved into a three part test for involuntary civil
commitment. First, the person must have a diagnosable mental
illness. Second, because of that mental illness, the person must
be proven a danger to himself and/or others. Third, there must
be no less restrictive alternative. 74
This civil commitment standard can be applied in
Ferguson where the patients who tested positive for cocaine
were mandated to attend inpatient substance abuse treatment
and could not leave under penalty of immediate arrest.
Addiction to alcohol and/or illegal drugs is a diagnosable
mental disorder.'7 5 However, it is not clear whether that mental
9Id.at 278.
170
171

172

§ 44-22-10.
422 U.S. 563 (1975).
S.C. CODE ANN.

Id. at 576.
§ 44-52-50.
ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH

173S.C. CODE ANN.
174

MENTAL DISABILITIES 26-36 (American Civil Liberties Union 1996).

175AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF
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disorder causes the mother to be a danger to others. Moreover,
there are obvious, less restrictive alternatives available, such
as outpatient drug treatment or individual psychotherapy.
A 1995 case in New York directly addressed this issue of
using involuntary commitment to protect a fetus from the
mother's substance abuse. The issue in In re Tanya P.176 was
whether a New York psychiatric facility could involuntarily
commit pregnant mothers based on the potential for fetal
endangerment caused by the mother's possible cocaine use
during her third trimester.'77 The New York Supreme Court
ruled that the physician's fear that the patient would resume a
life of drug use upon release was inadequate to meet the clear
and convincing standard required to prove dangerousness. 7 '
Moreover, the judge emphasized that there was an absence of
conclusive evidence of a direct connection, beyond correlation,
between cocaine use and harmful effects on a fetus once it is
born.'79 Very few courts have directly addressed this issue.
However, it is an important issue for the patients in Ferguson.
Using the civil commitment standards, Ferguson presents
of the requisite dangerousness
evidence
insufficient
requirement, in addition to insufficient proof of the absence of
a less restrictive alternative treatment.
2. Pregnancy
The fact that a mother's refusal of medical treatment
may potentially harm her fetus complicates this issue even
further. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 8' the Court
emphasized the uniqueness of the experience of a pregnant
mother:
The liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human
condition and so unique to the law. The mother who carries a child
to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain
that only she must bear. . . Her suffering is too intimate and
MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM IV-R 176 ( 4e ed. rev. 1994).
179 Cerisse

Anderson, Commitment Order to Protect Fetus Denied, N.Y.L.J.,

Feb. 27, 1995, at 1.
177 Id.

178Id.
179 Id.

ISO505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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personal for the State
to insist, without more, upon its own vision of
1 81
the woman's role.

However, the Court also made clear that when a fetus
reaches viability, the state's interest in preservation of a
potential life becomes compelling and can outweigh the
mother's interests.182 When evaluating a mother's medical
decision, the question becomes whether the mother's rights of
83
bodily integrity and privacy outweigh the rights of the fetus."

The Supreme Court first looked at the issue of parental versus
fetal rights in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists. 4 Evaluating various provisions of the
Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act, the Court ruled that the
mother's health should always be the "paramount
consideration. " 18'

The reasoning used in Thornburgh was relied on in the
first federal case that addressed a pregnant mother's right to
refuse medical treatment. Decided in 1987, In re A.C.'89
involved a mother who was six months pregnant and
terminally ill with cancer.8 7 The physicians believed that as
the mother's health worsened, the only chance to save the baby
was to perform a cesarean section.18 It was unclear in this case
what the mother's true wishes were, although her last
indication before becoming permanently unconscious was that
she did not want the surgery.'89 The hospital obtained a court
order and performed the cesarean section; both mother and
child died shortly after.19 The Court held that a competent
woman's decision should control in almost all cases.' Other
courts have followed this decision.9 Applying this decision to
181
Id. at 852.
182

Id. at 869-870.

'3 An in-depth discussion of the debate of fetal rights is beyond the scope of

this paper.

184476

U.S. 747 (1986).
'e Id. at 768-69.
18 573 A.2d. 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
187Id.

at 1238.

188Id.
89 Id. at 1241.
190Id.

at 1238.

191In reA C., 573 A.2d. at 1249.
,92 See In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (holding that a
state cannot override a competent woman's refusal of blood transfusions even if the
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Ferguson would suggest that the mother's decision whether to
seek treatment for her drug use should control, despite any
potential impact to the fetus.
C.

PersonalBehaviorDecisions

In cases that involve pregnant mothers, using illegal
drugs, the debate often centers on whether the mother is
harming her fetus with her behavior or whether she is simply
not aiding the fetus. There is no common law duty to aid a
third party.19 3 However, the relationship between a mother and
her unborn child is a parent-child relationship that has been
deemed by the courts a "special relationship."19 4 This legal duty
should not apply in the case of a pregnant mother. 5 Courts
have held that even in special relationships, the rescuer cannot
be required to endanger himself to aid another. 96 Because a
fetus does not receive the same legal recognition as a child, the
mother's responsibility to the fetus should not exceed her
responsibility to a living child-she should not be forced to
undergo
invasive procedures for the benefit of an unborn
1 97
child.
Although there was no actual physically invasive
medical treatment in Ferguson, the treatments are
comparable. The mothers were forced, for the benefit of their
unborn children, to either attend inpatient substance abuse
treatment, a potentially emotionally invasive treatment, or
face arrest and jail time, a significant restriction on their
liberty interests. This policy of protecting one's unborn fetus to
decision may be harmful to her fetus); In re Baby Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct.
1994) (holding that a woman's competent choice to refuse invasive medical treatment
must be honored even when the decision may be harmful to her fetus). But see
Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981) (holding
that an expectant mother whose fetus is viable lacks the right of other persons to
refuse medical treatment if the life of her fetus is at stake).
193AMA Board of Trustees, Legal Interventions DuringPregnancy,264 JAMA
2663, 2664 (1990).
194id.
195 Id.
'96See McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C. 3d. (1978) (court held that a person
could not be compelled to donate bone marrow to his cousin, even if it was the cousin's
only chance for survival).
197AMA Board of Trustees, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy, 264
JAMA
2663, 2664 (1990).
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the detriment of the mother's rights is very dangerous. MUSC
would argue that clearly it is acceptable to enforce such drastic
measures when the mother is endangering her fetus with
illegal drug use. But where does this justification end? Will
mothers also be civilly or criminally liable if they participate in
legal behaviors that might harm the fetus, such as alcohol or
tobacco use? Will the law stretch so far as to hold pregnant
women accountable for missing prenatal appointments or not
taking prenatal vitamins? If other courts follow the Ferguson
decision, there will be a movement to do away with a pregnant
woman's right to privacy all together.
Both the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit in
Ferguson failed to uphold the patients' privacy interest in
personal decision making. The Court ignored the fact that the
patients did not give voluntary informed consent to the
searches and were often subjected to unfairly deceptive tactics
by hospital personnel to obtain consent. In addition, the MUSC
policy violated the patients' right to refuse medical treatment
by forcing them to attend inpatient substance abuse treatment
or face immediate arrest. The women were involuntarily
committed without meeting the requisite dangerousness
requirement. 9 8 Both the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit
also failed to address the violation of the patients' privacy
interest in making personal behavior decisions without the
interference of government. This has the potential to
undermine a pregnant woman's right to privacy altogether.
CONCLUSION
The MUSC policy violated the Fourth Amendment
because it provided for warrantless searches of non-consenting
patients. Although the Supreme Court came to this conclusion,
it ignored the issue of consent, effectively leaving it possible for
Policy M-7 to be upheld on remand. Moreover, the Court
complicated the established special needs analysis by adding
an unnecessary step. The intense focus on law enforcement

'98See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.

2001]

FERGUSONv. CITY OF CHARLESTON

indicates that the search should not have been deemed a
special needs search, and the analysis should have ended
there.
In addition, both the Supreme Court and the Fourth
Circuit were wrong to avoid the significant issue of a privacy
interest in one's medical records. The patients' interests in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters was clearly violated
when the hospital turned over their entire medical records to
law enforcement without patient consent. The patients' privacy
interests in the content of those records outweighed the
government interest in full disclosure.
Moreover, the Court was wrong to ignore the important
issue of decision-making privacy. Mandating substance abuse
treatment without satisfying the required criteria for civil
commitment violated the patients' right to refuse medical
treatment. Forcing a woman to be liable for her personal
decisions according to how they might affect her unborn fetus
is an excessive intrusion on her personal privacy. In addition,
the Court set an unfortunate precedent in allowing a hospital
to use deceptive and covert tactics to obtain one's consent to
gather evidence against him or her.
The Supreme Court in Ferguson failed to fully address
all three facets of the right to privacy: (1) the right of the
individual to be free in his private affairs from government
surveillance and intrusion; (2) the individual interest in
avoiding disclosures of personal matters; and (3) the interest in
independence in making certain kinds of decisions.9 Although
the Court appears to protect privacy under the Fourth
Amendment, at closer review, the Court merely complicates the
well-established special needs analysis, while leaving the
search and seizure issue open by ignoring the question of
consent. For all these reasons, the Court failed to address the
fact that the MUSC policy violated one's right to privacy in
one's own medical records and violated one's right to make
independent decisions regarding one's medical treatment. In
doing so, the Court undermined the established privacy
doctrine and set a dangerous precedent for the future of a

"' Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600 n.24 (citations omitted).
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pregnant woman's right to privacy. Moreover, the Court
of life in the United States today, "the
violated the basic tenet
20 1
alone."
let
be
to
right
Erin F. Bartont

200

School.

Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
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